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Vertical Price Agreements in the
Wake of Leegin v. PSKS:
Where Do We Stand Now?*
JORDAN A. DRESNICK.± & THOMAS A. TUCKER RONZETTlt
I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
For nearly a century, agreements between retailers and suppliers
stipulating a minimum retail price were considered per se violations of
the Sherman Act.' Resale price maintenance ("RPM") agreements are
contracts in which a manufacturer and a downstream distributor
("retailer") agree to a minimum or maximum retail price that consumers
will pay.2 Antitrust violations are viewed either under a rule of reason,
where evidence of a defendant's conduct is admissible to explain away
the conduct, or as per se illegal, where the government or plaintiff need
only prove that the conduct existed for the defendant to be liable.3
Until 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court's nearly century-old opinion in
Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co. held RPM to be a
* The views expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and are not reflective of
Holland & Knight LLP, Kozyak Tropin & Throckmorton, P.A., or their affiliates. We would like
to thank Professor Kenneth G. Elzinga of the University of Virginia for his lifelong dedication to
the illuminable freedoms of the human mind, the late Professor Alan Swan of the University of
Miami for his endearing passion for the rule of law, Jesse McDonnell for his generous research
assistance, and the editorial board of the University of Miami Law Review.
± Jordan A. Dresnick practices commercial litigation and antitrust law with Holland &
Knight in Miami, Florida. B.A. with Distinction, University of Virginia; J.D., magna cum laude,
University of Miami School of Law.
t Thomas A. Tucker Ronzetti is a shareholder with Kozyak Tropin & Throckmorton, P.A.
in Miami, Florida, where he practices complex commercial litigation, antitrust, and class action
litigation. B.A., Duke University; J.D., magna cum laude, University of Miami School of Law.
1. Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 408 (1911), overruled by
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
2. See Terry Calvani & Andrew G. Berg, Resale Price Maintenance after Monsanto: A
Doctrine Still at War with Itself, 1984 DuKE L.J. 1163, 1163 n.1 (1984).
3. See generally Daniel A. Crane, Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication, 64
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 49 (2007); Gary Minda, Antitrust at Century's End, 48 SMU L. REv. 1749
(1995); Rudolph J. Peritz, The "Rule of Reason" in Antitrust Law: Property Logic in Restraint of
Competition, 40 HAsTINGs L.J. 285, 321-22 (1989) (discussing the rise of the rule of reason in N.
Secs. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904)). An intermediate mode of examination, called the
"abbreviated" or "quick-look" rule of reason analysis, also applies "to business activities that are
so plainly anticompetitive that courts need undertake only a cursory examination before imposing
antitrust liability." Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 7 n.3 (2006); see also Cal. Dental Ass'n v.
FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999) (explaining the application of the "abbreviated" or "quick-look"
analysis).
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per se violation4 of the Sherman Act.5 In a departure from its century-
old legacy of analyzing vertical price restraints as per se illegal, the U.S.
Supreme held in Leegin Creative Leather Products v. PSKS, Inc. that
manufacturers may lawfully set specified retail prices.6 While antitrust
issues do not frequently generate widespread public interest, Leegin war-
rants particular attention because it transforms the entire nature of retail
marketing and pricing nationwide.
PSKS argued for stare decisis, noting the reliance by courts, indus-
try, and consumers on Dr. Miles and acknowledging that Congress had
explicitly strayed over the decades from modifying the per se rule.7 The
company also suggested that lower courts may find it difficult to apply a
rule of reason analysis.8 Leegin Creative Leather Products, on the other
hand, contended that the Court should consider the progress in economic
research since Dr. Miles was decided and that most economists now
support a rule of reason analysis to promote consumer welfare, increase
interbrand competition, encourage new entry to the market, and over-
come free riding.9
This article discusses the jurisprudence leading up to Leegin and
the adoption of a rule of reason analysis. Further, it provides analysis on
the manner in which the U.S. district and circuit courts have interpreted
Leegin. This article explores the current state of RPM and thwarts the
argument that the nation's federal courts are unable to handle rule of
reason analysis in the RPM context.
We proceed as follows: Part II describes resale price maintenance
and the progeny of Supreme Court cases relating to RPM. Part III pro-
vides the underlying facts in Leegin. Part IV presents the arguments of
both parties. Part V discusses the Court's decision, beginning with the
majority opinion and concluding with the dissent. Part VI discusses the
current state of the law on vertical price agreements. Part VII offers
thoughts for future research and concluding remarks.
II. BACKGROUND TO RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE
Resale price maintenance ("RPM"), also known as a "restriction[]
on distribution," is a contractual agreement between vertically related
4. Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 408.
5. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2006). This article is limited to § 1 of the Act: "Every
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."
6. 551 U.S. 877, 882 (2007).
7. Brief of Respondent at 7-21, Leegin, 551 U.S. 877 (No. 06-480).
8. See infra Part IV.
9. Brief for Petitioner at 13-14, Leegin, 551 U.S. 877 (No. 06-480).
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firms. 10 It is often described as "supplier control of the price at which
merchandise is resold by the dealer."' 1 For example, an upstream party,
such as a manufacturer, may restrict the conduct of the downstream
party, such as a distributor or retailer. 12 RPM can take the form of either
subtle coercion imposed by a supplier on the downstream retailer, or an
explicit contract in which a manufacturer sets the price at which the
downstream party can resell merchandise.13 The Supreme Court first
confronted RPM nearly 100 years ago in Dr. Miles. 4
A. Dr. Miles Medical Co.
Dr. Miles Medical Company ("Miles") manufactured and sold pro-
prietary medicines that were prepared by way of secret formulas and that
were identified by distinctive trademarks.15 Miles had established signif-
icant business throughout the United States and abroad. 6 The company
wholesaled medicines at or above set prices to jobbers and wholesale
druggists, who in turn distributed them to retail druggists, who were
advised of the price above which the merchandise was to be sold. 7 John
D. Park & Sons, Co. ("Park") was a wholesaler of medicines and refused
to enter into the required contract with Miles.' 8 Instead, Park attempted
to purchase Miles's medicines for sale at "cut prices" by inducing con-
tracting wholesalers to sell at a discounted price. 9 Miles filed suit to
enjoin Park from attempting to obtain a discount.2 0
The Dr. Miles Court focused on the legality of the contracts
between Miles and the downstream distributors in which the retailers
agreed to sell merchandise at prices set by Miles.2 ' Writing over the
dissent by Justice Holmes, Justice Hughes opined that the contracts were
not valid.22 The Court rejected Miles's contention that minimum resale
10. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST 215 (4th ed. 2005).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason,
53 ANTITRUST L.J. 135, 140-53 (1984); Benjamin Klein & Kevin M. Murphy, Vertical Restraints
as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms, 31 J.L. & EcoN. 265 (1988); Howard P. Marvel, The
Resale Price Maintenance Controversy: Beyond the Conventional Wisdom, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 59
(1994).
14. See Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911), overruled by
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
15. Id. at 394.
16. See id.
17. See id. at 395.
18. Id. at 394.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 394-95.
21. Id. at 395.
22. Id. at 408-09.
2009]
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prices were needed to prevent attrition of its dealer organization as a
result of price discounting. 23 Acknowledging that restraints upon aliena-
tion were typically analyzed under a rule of reason,24 the majority stated
that "agreements or combinations between dealers, having for their sole
purpose the destruction of competition and the fixing of prices, are inju-
rious to the public interest and void. '25 Antitrust policy played a minor
role in the majority's decision,2 6 as the court ultimately based its opinion
on the common law regarding restraints against alienation. 27 Notwith-
standing the Court's orientation, Dr. Miles signified that resale price
maintenance fell under the ambit of the Sherman Act as a per se
violation.28
B. The Colgate Doctrine
Supreme Court decisions following Dr. Miles attempted to deter-
mine what type of conduct satisfied the concerted action requirement
under the Sherman Act. Eight years after opining in Dr. Miles, the
Supreme Court issued an exception to the per se rule in United States v.
Colgate & Co. 9 Colgate & Company ("Colgate") manufactured soap
and toiletry items, which were sold across the country.3" The United
States government alleged that Colgate had unlawfully engaged in a
combination with retailers for the purpose of preventing discounting by
forcing retailers to maintain specified prices.31 However, the govern-
ment never charged Colgate with entering into a contract with retailers
to restrain trade or fix retail prices.32 The salient facts merely provided
that Colgate refused to sell to retailers who would not adhere to indi-
cated prices.33
The Court examined the issue under the Sherman Act.34 The Col-
gate majority held that "[i]n the absence of any purpose to create or
maintain a monopoly, the [A]ct does not restrict the long recognized
23. Id. at 407-08.
24. Id. at 406.
25. Id. at 408.
26. Calvani & Berg, supra note 2, at 1168.
27. Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 406, 408-09.
28. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 386 (1951) ("Resale price
maintenance was indeed struck down in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co."); Yentsch v.
Texaco, Inc., 630 F.2d 46, 51 (2d Cir. 1980) ("The Supreme Court originally made this position
clear in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co. when it proscribed written contracts between
the manufacturer and dealers fixing retail prices." (citation omitted)).
29. 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
30. Id. at 302.
31. Id. at 302-03.
32. Id. at 304-05.
33. Id. at 305.
34. Id. at 306.
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right of trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business,
freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with
whom he will deal."35 By extension, a manufacturer may announce in
advance the circumstances under which the company will refuse to
sell.36 "'A retail dealer has the unquestioned right to stop dealing with a
wholesaler for reasons sufficient to himself, and may do so because he
thinks such dealer is acting unfairly in trying to undermine his trade.' ",3
Colgate came to stand for the proposition that "a nonmonopolistic man-
ufacturer [may] refuse to deal with retailers who do not comply with an
announced resale price maintenance (RPM) policy under which a manu-
facturer sets the price at which retailers must sell its goods."38
C. The Progeny Following Colgate
Just a few years after carving out the Colgate exception, the
Supreme Court again confronted antitrust concerns among manufactur-
ers. In United States v. General Electric Co., the Court created an excep-
tion for consignment sales made through suppliers' "agents."39 Between
1963 and 1977, the Court granted certiorari to a series of cases to deter-
mine whether the Dr. Miles per se rule should apply to nonprice
restraints, such as territorial divisions.4" The Court yielded three differ-
ent answers:4' maybe,42 yes,43 and no.44 The last answer provided "a
35. Id. at 307.
36. Id. ("'The trader or manufacturer, on the other hand, carries on an entirely private
business, and can sell to whom he pleases."' (quoting United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight
Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 320 (1897))).
37. Id. (quoting E. States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 614
(1914); citing Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 56 (1911); United States v.
Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 180 (1911); Boston Store v. Am. Graphophone Co., 246 U.S. 8
(1918)).
38. Kathryn A. Kusske, Note, Refusal to Deal as a Per Se Violation of the Sherman Act:
Russell Stover Attacks the Colgate Doctrine, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 463, 463-64 (1984).
39. See United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 483-84, 488 (1926).
40. See Glen 0. Robinson, Explaining Vertical Agreements: The Colgate Puzzle and Antitrust
Method, 80 VA. L. REV., 577, 578 (1994) (citing White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253
(1963); United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), overruled by Cont'l T.V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977)).
41. Id.
42. See White Motor Co., 372 U.S. at 263-64 (holding that sutmary judgment was not
appropriate where a manufacturer allegedly instituted a vertical arrangement restricting its dealers'
territory). The Court noted that more information about the actual impact of the arrangements on
competition was needed for a ruling on whether they had a pernicious impact on competition and
lacked "'any redeeming virtue' and therefore should be classified as per se violations of the
Sherman Act." Id. (citation omitted)
43. See Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. at 379 (holding that a manufacturer's sale of
merchandise to a distributor, subject to a territorial restriction upon resale, was a per se violation
of the Sherman Act). "If the manufacturer parts with dominion over his product or transfers risk of
loss to another, he may not reserve control over its destiny or the conditions of its resale." Id.
44. See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 57-59 (holding that because such vertical territorial restrictions
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
new dimension to the growing confusion over vertical restraints law" as
the Court's rationales for failing to apply the per se rule to nonprice
restraints were "virtually identical" to those it rejected for applying a
rule of reason analysis to price restraints.45
In 1984, the Court once again reexamined nonprice vertical
restraints in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.4 6 In spite of a
divide among the circuits47 and an invitation by the Justice Department
to overturn the per se rule against vertical price restraints,48 the Mon-
santo Court continued to honor the precedent established in Dr. Miles.4 9
Monsanto terminated a discount distributor after implementing new
criteria for awarding distributorships5" and after other distributors had
complained about the terminated distributor's resale prices.5" The Court
held that the correct standard for determining whether a Sherman Act
violation occurred was whether direct or circumstantial evidence existed
that "reasonably tend[ed] to prove that the manufacturer and others had
a conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an
unlawful objective."52 Citing Dr. Miles, the Court distinguished price
and nonprice restrictions, noting that the former are per se illegal, while
the latter are judged under the rule of reason.53
Four years after changing the standard in Monsanto, the Supreme
Court reexamined vertical price restraints in Business Electronics Corp.
v. Sharp Electronics Corp.54 An electronics retailer filed suit against a
manufacturer under the Sherman Act, alleging a conspiracy to terminate
were widely used, and because there was no showing that the restrictions had a pernicious effect
on competition or that the restrictions lacked any redeeming virtue, the per se rule was the
incorrect standard under which to analyze the restrictions). Instead, the rule of reason should be
the standard in matters involving nonprice vertical restraints, because such business conduct could
be adequately policed under the rule of reason Id.
45. Robinson, supra note 40, at 578; see also Robert Pitofsky, The Sylvania Case: Antitrust
Analysis of Non-Price Vertical Restrictions, 78 COLuM. L. REV. 1, 18-22 (1978); Richard A.
Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45
U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 7-9 (1977).
46. 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
47. Id. at 759 n.5.
48. Id. at 761 n.7.
49. Robinson, supra note 40, at 578.
50. Monsanto, 466 U.S. at 756-57.
51. Id. at 758-59.
52. id. at 768.
53. Id. at 761 (An "important distinction in distributor-termination cases is that between
concerted action to set prices and concerted action on nonprice restrictions. The former have been
per se illegal since the early years of national antitrust enforcement. The latter are judged under
the rule of reason, which requires a weighing of the relevant circumstances of a case to decide
whether a restrictive practice constitutes an unreasonable restraint on competition." (citing Dr.
Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 404-09 (1911), overruled by Leegin
Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. 551 U.S. 877 (2007))).
54. 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
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the retailer for discounting products below the prices charged by neigh-
boring retail vendors.55 Grounding its rationale on the GTE Sylvania
doctrine, the Sharp Court held for a presumption in favor of a rule of
reason analysis in matters involving vertical restraints 56 and found such
practices to be per se illegal only where they include some agreement as
to price.57 Taken together, "Monsanto and Sharp permit a finding that a
manufacturer's announced policy of refusing to deal with discounters,
terminations of discounters, and complaints by retailers to the manufac-
turer about discounters are not sufficient evidence from which to infer a
price fixing agreement."58
1II. LEEGIN CREATIVE LEATHER PRODUCTS v. PSKS, INC.
59
A. Background Facts
Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. ("Leegin"), a creator and
distributor of leather goods, sold belts under the brand name Brighton.6"
"The Brighton brand [soon] expanded into a variety of women's fashion
accessories."" PSKS, Inc. ("PSKS") operated Kay's Kloset, a women's
apparel store that purchased Brighton products.62 At one point, Brighton
sales accounted for forty to fifty percent of Kay's Kloset's profits.63
"[B]y 1999, Brighton was PSKS' best-selling and most profitable
line."64
Brighton products were sold across the United States in over 5,000
retail establishments, mostly in small boutiques and specialty stores.65
55. Id. at 721.
56. Id. at 726.
Our approach to the question presented in the present case is guided by the premises
of GTE Sylvania and Monsanto: that there is a presumption in favor of a rule-of-
reason standard; that departure from that standard must be justified by demonstrable
economic effect, such as the facilitation of cartelizing, rather than formalistic
distinctions; that interbrand competition is the primary concern of the antitrust laws;
and that rules in this area should be formulated with a view towards protecting the
doctrine of GTE Sylvania. These premises lead us to conclude that the line drawn by
the Fifth Circuit [holding that only vertical price restrictions are per se illegal] is the
most appropriate one.
Id.
57. Id. at 735-36.
58. Jayma M. Meyer, Relaxation of the Per Se Mantra in the Vertical Price Fixing Arena, 68
S. CAL. L. REV. 73, 80-81 (1994).
59. 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
60. Id. at 882.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 883.
64. PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., 171 F. App'x 464, 465 (5th Cir. 2006)
(per curiam), rev'd, 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
65. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 882.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
To distinguish itself from competitors, Leegin sold its goods primarily
through smaller retailers.66 The company claimed that boutique retailers
generally treated customers better, provided greater quality customer
service, and made the experience more satisfactory compared to shop-
ping in large, chain stores.67
In 1997, Leegin instituted the "Brighton Retail Pricing and Promo-
tion Policy" under which the company "refused to sell to retailers that
discounted Brighton goods below suggested prices. '68 Leegin claimed
that the policy provided retailers with the margins required to maintain
high customer service and eradicated the growing use of discounting that
"harmed Brighton's brand image and reputation. 69 The following year,
Leegin introduced the "Heart Store Program," a marketing strategy
under which a retailer agreed to "follow the Brighton Suggested Pricing
Policy at all times."7 °
"In December 2002, Leegin discovered Kay's Kloset had been
marking down Brighton's entire line by [twenty] percent... to compete
with nearby retailers who also were undercutting Leegin's suggested
prices. '"71 After learning of PSKS's pricing, "Leegin suspended all ship-
ments of Brighton products to PSKS. 72 Kay's Kloset's revenues fell
considerably with the loss of the Brighton brand.73 An antitrust action
soon followed. 4
B. Procedure Below
PSKS sued Leegin in the United States District Court for the East-
ern District of Texas under § 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, claiming
that Leegin "entered into illegal agreements with retailers to fix Brighton
products' prices and terminated PSKS as a result of those agreements. 75
PSKS alleged that Leegin "had violated the antitrust laws by entering
into agreements with retailers to charge [retail] prices fixed by
Leegin."76 Leegin attempted to utilize Professor Kenneth Elzinga of the
University of Virginia as an expert witness to describe the procompeti-
66. See id. at 882-83.
67. Id. at 882.
68. Id. at 883.
69. Id.
70. PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., 171 F. App'x 464, 465 (5th Cir. 2006)
(internal quotation marks omitted), rev'd 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
71. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 884.
72. PSKS, 171 F. App'x at 466.
73. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 884.
74. Id.
75. PSKS, 171 F. App'x at 466.
76. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 884 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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tive effects of its pricing policy.7 7 The district court excluded the testi-
mony, relying on the per se rule of Dr. Miles.78 In a jury trial, PSKS
argued that Leegin and its retailers had agreed to fix prices.7 9 Over
Leegin's argument that its pricing policy fell within the Colgate excep-
tion, o the jury agreed with PSKS and awarded it a judgment of $1.2
million.8' The district court trebled the damages and added attorney's
fees, resulting in judgment against Leegin in the amount of
$3,975,000.80.82
Leegin appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, challenging the application of the per se rule to resale price
maintenance and instead arguing for the application of the rule of rea-
son.83 The Fifth Circuit rejected Leegin's argument and affirmed the dis-
trict court's exclusion of Elzinga's testimony because "the per se rule
rendered irrelevant any procompetitive justifications for Leegin's pric-
ing policy."84 The Supreme Court "granted certiorari to determine
whether vertical minimum resale price maintenance agreements should
continue to be treated as per se unlawful.
'8 5
IV. Two SIDES OF A COIN: ARGUMENTS BY THE PARTIES
A. Leegin's Argument
Leegin framed the issue before the Court as whether vertical mini-
mum resale price maintenance should be held per se illegal or evaluated
under the rule of reason.86 The company contended that while the per se
rule was premised on an "antiquated common-law rule against
'restraints on alienation,"' it "squarely conflict[ed] with ... modern eco-
nomic understanding" that resale price agreements have procompetitive
effects.87 The prevailing view among economists that the per se rule of
77. See id.; see also Leegin's Response to Plaintiffs' Motion to Limit Testimony of Kenneth
G. Elzinga, Ph.D. at 2-3, PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., 2004 WL 5254322
(E.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 2004) (No. 2:03-CV-107).
78. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 884.
79. Id.
80. Id. (citing United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919)).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 884-85
84. Id. at 885 (citing PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., 171 F. App'x 464,
46667 (5th Cir. 2006), rev'd, 551 U.S. 877 (2007)).
85. Id. at 885.
86. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at i.
87. Id. at 2; see, e.g., id. at 13 (The "bulk of the economic literature on RPM... suggests that
RPM is more likely to be used to enhance efficiency than for anticompetitive purposes."
(alteration in original) (quoting ABA SECTION OF ANTIrUIST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW AND
EcONONICS OF PRODUCT DIsTIBUTION 76 (2006))); THOMAS R. OVERSTREET, JR., FED. TRADE.
COMM'N, RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE: ECONOMIC THEORIEs AND EMPIRIcAL EVIDENCE 164
2009]
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Dr. Miles should be overturned was underscored by the amicus curiae
brief submitted on behalf of over two dozen distinguished economists,
who urged the Court to review RPM under the rule of reason.88
To further support extending the rule of reason to RPM, Leegin
raised the issue of interbrand competition, which is the "primary concern
of antitrust law."'89 It noted the Court's prior opinion that "[v]ertical
restrictions promote interbrand competition by allowing the manufac-
turer to achieve certain efficiencies in the distribution of his products." 90
Leegin argued that its marketing strategy fostered interbrand competi-
tion by requiring stores to provide a high degree of customer service and
an attractive presentation, which forces manufacturers to compete on
more than mere price.9 1 As a result of the increased competition, compa-
nies must continuously innovate and improve products, thereby benefit-
ing consumers.
According to Leegin, manufacturers can utilize RPM to enhance
interbrand competition through advertising and improved retail ser-
(1983) ("[T]he economic theories and the available empirical evidence rather clearly suggest that
the rigid application of a strict standard of per se illegality for RPM is inappropriate.").
88. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 13-14 & n.5 (citing Brief of Amici Curiae
Economists in Support of Petitioner at 3-4 & app. la-4a, Leegin, 551 U.S. 877 (No. 06-480))
("The amici economists included members of... leading academic institutions, as well as nine
economists who ha[d] served as either the Director of the Bureau of Economics of the Federal
Trade Commission or Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Economic Analysis at the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice (the highest-ranking economist at each agency).").
89. Id. at 15 (quoting Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 52 n.19 (1977))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
90. Id. (quoting Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 54) (internal quotation marks omitted).
91. See id. at 19-20. This presupposes that the retailer earns a profit substantial enough to
provide quality customer service and an upscale presentation while minimizing free riding. See
Benjamin Klein, Distribution Restrictions Operate By Creating Dealer Profits: Explaining the
Use of Maximum Resale Price Maintenance in State Oil v. Khan, 7 Sup. CT. EcoN. REV. 1, 6
(1999) ("When dealers are competing with one another, each dealer's point-of-sale promotional
activities (such as product demonstrations by a salesperson or shelf space displays) may increase
not only the dealer's own sales, but also other dealers' sales. Because of this 'externality,' dealers
receive only a fraction of the return from their promotional efforts and, therefore, each dealer has
a reduced incentive to promote the manufacturer's product. This positive promotional externality
between dealers creates the potential for what can be labeled 'classic dealer free-riding,' where a
dealer supplies less promotion than desired by the manufacturer and 'free rides' on the
promotional efforts of other dealers. The most common formulation of this 'classic dealer free
riding' problem concerns a consumer's first visiting a full service dealer, who creates a demand
for the manufacturer's product by supplying the desired point-of-sale promotional services, and
then visiting a competing low service (and hence low cost) dealer to purchase the product at a
lower price." (citing Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. &
ECON. 86 (1960)). Leegin argued that in the presence of the free rider problem, the Supreme Court
has recognized that "dealers lose the incentive to make investments that are valuable to consumers
and enhance the competitiveness of the manufacturer's product because the free rider siphons off
so many sales that the other retailers are not able to recover their investments in promotional
services." Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 16 (citing Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 55).
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vices. 92 For example, "a manufacturer could use resale price mainte-
nance to provide incentives for retailers to engage in promotional
activities that are necessary to the efficient marketing of its products
.... "I' That is, by selling its brand to stores on the condition that each
retailer's price does not fall below some minimum level, the manufac-
turer prevents any retailer from hindering other vendors by charging a
lower price.94 RPM thereby enables the manufacturer to provide a suffi-
cient retail markup to achieve the requisite level of retail service.95 In
summary, consumers benefit because once prices settle to the minimum
level specified in the RPM agreement, retailers compete with each other
for sales by offering valuable retail services to consumers.96
Leegin posited that its legal argument was consistent with the
Court's relatively recent opinions that overturned the per se treatment of
vertical agreements that do not invariably produce anticompetitive
effects.9 7 In Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., the Supreme
Court explained that "[pier se rules of illegality are appropriate only
when they relate to conduct that is manifestly anticompetitive."98 The
Court clarified that interbrand competition "is the primary concern of
antitrust law"99 and further explained that vertical restrictions have the
"potential for a simultaneous reduction of intrabrand competition and
stimulation of interbrand competition."'0 Leegin noted, "In light of
potential procompetitive effects on interbrand competition, the [Sylva-
nia] Court concluded that . . . vertical nonprice agreements should be
[analyzed] under the rule of reason."' 0 '
Leegin further argued that per se rules ignore competitive effects of
vertical price restraints.' 02 According to Leegin, empirical studies find
that it is "far more common" for RPM to generate procompetitive effects
than to facilitate a cartel.1"3 Further, the Supreme Court has previously
92. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 3, 19-21.
93. Id. at 6-7.
94. See Telser, supra note 91, at 91-92.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 6. Specifically, Leegin cited State Oil Co. v. Khan,
522 U.S. 3, 18 (1997), which "unanimously overturn[ed] the per se rule against vertical maximum
price-fixing because there was 'insufficient economic justification' for the rule" and Cont'l T.V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 47--48 (1977), which "reject[ed] the per se rule against
vertical nonprice restraints." Id.
98. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 49-50.
99. Id. at 52 n.19.
100. Id. at 51-52.
101. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 11 (citing Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 59).
102. See id. at 8.
103. Id. at 21 (citing Pauline M. Ippolito, Resale Price Maintenance: Empirical Evidence from
Litigation, 34 J.L. & ECON. 263, 282 (1991)).
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recognized the import of vertical price restraints on promoting competi-
tion, particularly by small, new entrants.' ° Therefore, Leegin asserted,
"There [was] neither an empirical nor a theoretical basis" to justify a per
se ban on RPM. 105
In Leegin's view, there was also no legal argument to justify a per
se rule against RPM because the Supreme Court previously held that per
se rules are only appropriate "where a practice always, or almost always,
results in anticompetitive effects."' °6 The Court previously found a per
se rule to be appropriate "[o]nce experience with a particular kind of
restraint enables the Court to predict with confidence that the rule of
reason will condemn it."' 7 Leegin argued, based on the findings of its
economic expert, "[tjhere [was] simply no plausible scenario in which
Leegin's pricing policy [would] have a substantial adverse effect in any
relevant market."'
10 8
Leegin contended that a rule of reason analysis would be just as
forceful as a per se rule at curtailing anticonsumer practices. 109 If Leegin
were to utilize RPM to maintain retail prices above the market rate, con-
sumers could punish the manufacturer by buying fashion accessories
from competitors. 10 The market would efficiently correct prices, and
Leegin would then need to immediately lower its price or lose business
to other manufacturers."1
Leegin argued that stare decisis is not a valid basis to leave the
nearly century-old per se rule of Dr. Miles untouched." 2 In particular,
"[i]n the area of antitrust law, there is a competing interest, well repre-
sented in th[e] Court's decisions, in recognizing and adapting to changed
circumstances and the lessons of accumulated experience."' 1 3 This is
104. See, e.g., Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 65 (White, J., concurring) ("[T]he potential benefits of
vertical restraints in promoting interbrand competition are particularly strong where the
manufacturer imposing the restraints is seeking to enter a new market or to expand a small market
share.").
105. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 21.
106. Id. at 22 (citing Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988)).
107. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (alteration in original) (quoting Arizona v.
Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted).
108. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 23 (citing KENNETHi G. ELZINGA, AN ECON OMIC
ANALYSIS OF THE ANTrrRUST ISSUES IN PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Leather Products, Inc. (Jan. 12,
2004) [hereinafter Elzinga Report], noted in Petition for a Writ of Certiorari app. D, at 43a-44a,
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 887 (2007) (No. 06-480)).
109. See id. at 7.
110. Id. at 22-23 (citing Elzinga Report, supra note 108, at 36a-37a)).
111. Id. at 23 ("'A firm that has no market power is unlikely to adopt policies that disserve its
consumers; it cannot afford to. And if it blunders and does adopt such a policy, market retribution
will be swift.'" (quoting Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Imps., Ltd., 678 F.2d 742, 745 (7th Cir.
1982))).
112. Id. at 32 (citing State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, at 20-21 (1997)).
113. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Khan, 522 U.S. at 20).
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reflective of Justice White's opinion in the landmark antitrust case Stan-
dard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, noting that unlawful
restraints of trade should be "determined by the light of reason."
114
Leegin's final argument rested on the abiding principle that "lower
courts are fully capable of applying the rule of reason" analysis. 15
Leegin argued that a transition from per se illegality to a rule of reason
analysis would promote consumer welfare because a per se regime
enables downstream retailers to file suit even when they are unable to
demonstrate anticompetitive behavior. 16 According to Leegin, if distrib-
utors were required to evidence an adverse effect on competition, there
would likely be "fewer economically groundless lawsuits attacking ver-




PSKS framed the issue as a matter of price fixing.118 The company
cited the trial record testimony of Jerry Kohl, Leegin's president and
owner: "[W]e require every one of our customers . . . to charge the same
price." '119 PSKS also introduced portions of the record to show that
Leegin paid for the travel expenses of retail corporate representatives to
attend meetings regarding practicing strategies,12 ° as well as evidence
that Leegin orchestrated prices and discounting between competing
retailers. 
121
On a legal front, PSKS based its argument on stare decisis, 2 2 spe-
cifically noting the doctrine to be at its height when dealing with inter-
pretation of statutes, such as the Sherman Act. 23 "[T]he doctrine carries
such persuasive force that [the Court] has always required a departure
114. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 64 (1911).
115. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 36.
116. Id.
117. Id. (citing Brief of CTIA - the Wireless Ass'n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner
at 11, Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (No. 06-480)).
118. Brief of Respondent, supra note 7, at 2 ("Leegin enforced the price fixing agreements
against all of its retailers.").
119. Id. (alteration in original).
120. Id. at 3.
121. See id. at 2-3.
122. Id. at 5 (citing Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000)); see, e.g., Randall v.
Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 243-44 (2006) (plurality opinion) ("[S]tare decisis 'promotes the
evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on
judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.'"
(quoting United States v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp. (IBM), 517 U.S. 843, 856 (1996))); see also
Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 556-57 (2002) (plurality opinion).
123. Brief of Respondent, supra note 7, at 8 (citing IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 32
(2005); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 493, 506 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
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from precedent to be supported by some special justification."'124 PSLS
noted that a special justification was "especially necessary where, as
here, the principle has become settled through iteration and reiteration
over a long period of time."'
' 25
PSKS contended that the nearly century-long precedent of Dr.
Miles should suppress any transition to a rule of reason analysis.1
26
PSKS argued that the Leegin Court should not now overturn a well-
established legal principle. 27 For example, in Federal Baseball Club of
Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, the
Supreme Court held that baseball was not subject to challenge under the
Sherman Act. 28 Despite significant question from later cases, the Court
has yet to overturn the decision and has effectively held antitrust laws to
apply to every business except baseball.
2 9
PSKS argued that Congress had directly and indirectly endorsed the
per se rule by revisiting the area of RPM "almost in clockwork [twenty]-
year cycles," consistently recognizing the standard created in Dr.
Miles.'3 ° According to PSKS, Congress crystallized its intent in 1975 by
passing "[a]n act to amend the Sherman Antitrust Act to provide lower
prices for consumers,"'' which repealed previous legislation that per-
mitted manufacturers to set retail prices in certain circumstances. 132 Fur-
ther, after the Department of Justice (DOJ) filed an amicus brief in
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.'33 in support of overturning
Dr. Miles, Congress passed an appropriation measure that discontinued
all funds to the DOJ that would have been used "to overturn or alter the
per se prohibition on resale price maintenance."' 34 PSKS concluded that
124. Id. at 7 (second alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Dickerson, 530 U.S. at
443) (internal quotations marks omitted).
125. Id. (quoting Sorrell, 548 U.S. at 244 (plurality opinion)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
126. See id. at 8 ("Dr. Miles has been settled precedent for nearly 100 years, and experience
with the per se rule has served to establish its correctness. The long-standing application of the per
se rule against vertical minimum RPM has created 'settled legal expectations.' To overturn or alter
the rule now would create just the 'instability and unfairness' that stare decisis is designed to
avoid." (quoting Sorrell, 548 U.S. at 2444 (plurality opinion); citing IBM, 517 U.S. at 856)).
127. Id. at 7-8.
128. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
129. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972).
130. Brief of Respondent, supra note 7, at 10-11 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 102-237, at 4
(1991)).
131. Id. at 12 (quoting Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801
(1975) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970))).
132. Id. at 11-12.
133. 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
134. Brief of Respondent, supra note 7, at 14 (quoting Pub. L. No. 98-166, 97 Stat. 1071
(1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing congressional response to the amicus brief
that the DOJ filed in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984)).
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the Court, Congress, industry, and consumers have relied on Dr. Miles
to decide cases, draft laws, and conduct business, especially in the devel-
opment of large discount retailers.135
Finally, PSKS claimed that consumer well-being would be
adversely affected by replacing the per se rule with a rule of reason.1
36
The company suggested that antitrust policy is about promoting low
prices and that resale price maintenance reduces price competition
between rival brands. 137 According to PSKS, replacing the Dr. Miles
precedent with a rule of reason could cloud the distinction between "car-
tels formed by retailers and restrictions imposed by manufacturers,"
thereby further diminishing consumer welfare.
138
V. THE SUPREME COURT'S OPINION
A. Justice Kennedy's Majority Opinion
Writing for a five-member majority,139 Justice Kennedy framed the
issue as whether the per se rule against vertical price restraints should be
abandoned in the face of "[r]espected economic analysts" who "con-
clude that [such] restraints can have procompetitive effects."' 4 ° Contrary
to a per se rule, the rule of reason is the "accepted standard for testing
whether a practice restrains trade in violation" of the Sherman Act.14 1
Under such an analysis, "the factfinder weighs all of the circumstances
of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited
as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition." '142 While a per se
rule can provide clear guidance for the legality of certain conduct, the
rules are only appropriate where courts have significant familiarity with
the restraint in question and can reasonably expect that it will most
likely yield an economic outcome adverse to consumers.143 A per se rule
is therefore not appropriate when it is simply premised on "formalistic
135. Id. at 16-19; see also David W. Boyd, From "Mom and Pop" to Wal-Mart: The Impact
of the Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975 on the Retail Sector in the United States, 31 J. EcoN.
IsSuEs 223 (1997).
136. See Brief of Respondent, supra note 7, at 21-23.
137. Id. at 22 (quoting White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 268 (1963) (Brennan,
J., concurring)).
138. See id. at 25.
139. The majority also included Chief Justice John Roberts, Justice Antonin Scalia, Justice
Samuel Alito, and Justice Clarence Thomas.
140. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 881-82 (2007).
141. Id. at 885 (citing Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006)).
142. Id. (quoting Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977)) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752,
768 (1984) (equating the rule of reason with "an inquiry into market power and market structure
designed to assess [a restraint's] actual effect").
143. See Leegin, 551 U.S at 886-87; Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441
U.S. 1, 9 (1979); Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 49-50.
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line drawing." 144 The rule of reason distinguishes between restraints that
are harmful to the consumer and those in the consumer's best interest
that stimulate competition."14
The Leegin Court opined that Dr. Miles was premised on the com-
mon-law rule that a "general restraint upon alienation is ordinarily inva-
lid"' 146 rather than on business and economic reasoning. 14 7 The Court
also cautioned against putting concrete weight on antiquated doctrines
and reaffirmed the "effect of the antitrust laws upon vertical distribu-
tional restraints in the American economy today." 148 Dr. Miles was fur-
ther flawed because it incorrectly treated vertical agreements that a
manufacturer makes with its distributors as similar to horizontal combi-
nations between competing distributors; 49 however, as the Court
pointed out in Leegin, horizontal and vertical restraints carry different
legal defenses. 
150
After concluding that "the reasons upon which Dr. Miles relied [no
longer] justif[ied] a per se rule," the Court turned to the economic
effects of vertical price agreements. 5' It first established that manufac-
turers have ample procompetitive justifications for engaging in RPM
agreements, such as stimulating interbrand competition. 52 The majority
next turned to free-riding, noting that without vertical price restraints,
retailers might underprovide retail services that enhance interbrand com-
144. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 887 (quoting Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 58-59) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
145. Id. at 886.
146. Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 404 (1911), overruled by
Leegin, 551 U.S. 877.
147. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 887-88.
148. Id. at 888 (quoting Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 53 n.21) (internal quotation marks omitted).
149. Id. (citing Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 407-08).
150. See id. (referencing Supreme Court precedent such as Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs.
Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 734 (1988), "disclaiming the 'notion of equivalence between the scope of
horizontal per se illegality and that of vertical per se illegality'" and Arizona v. Maricopa County
Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 348 n.18 (1982), noting that "'horizontal restraints are generally less
defensible than vertical restraints' ").
151. Id. at 889.
152. Id. The Court quoted three sources in support of this proposition: "In the theoretical
literature, it is essentially undisputed that minimum [resale price maintenance] can have
procompetitive effects and that under a variety of market conditions it is unlikely to have
anticompetitive effects." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Brief of Amici Curiae Economists in
Support of Petitioner, supra note 88, at 16) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[T]here is a
widespread consensus that permitting a manufacturer to control the price at which its goods are
sold may promote interbrand competition and consumer welfare in a variety of ways." Id.
(alteration in original) (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner
at 9, Leegin, 551 U.S. 877 (No. 06-480) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[T]he bulk of the
economic literature on [resale price maintenance] suggests that [it] is more likely to be used to
enhance efficiency than for anticompetitive purposes." Id. (alterations in original) (quoting ABA
SEC1r1oN oF Ar=rrxUsT LAW, supra note 87, at 76) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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petition.153 To learn about products, consumers may seek out a retailer
that "invests in fine showrooms, offers product demonstrations, [and]
* . . trains knowledgeable employees." 154 Alternatively, the consumers
could be lured to purchase a product after "see[ing] it in a retail estab-
lishment that has a reputation for selling high-quality merchandise."' 55
Either way, the consumer may purchase the item from a discount store.
Such stores are able to maintain smaller margins because they do not
expend as much capital to provide high-quality services, train employ-
ees, maintain their reputation, or provide demonstrations.
15 6
The Court noted that RPM can assuage the free-rider problem by
inhibiting the discounter from undercutting the high-quality retailer.'57
This in turn forces retailers to "compete among themselves over ser-
vices."' 58 RPM can further induce competition between brands by
encouraging market entry.' 59 In the absence of RPM, it is difficult for
new entrants to emerge; however, RPM helps late entrants facilitate
marketing, since those without a market presence can contract with
retailers to provide point-of-sale marketing.
60
The Court also recognized that RPM is not devoid of the potential
to create unlawful conduct. 161 For example, it may provide a convenient
disguise for manufacturer cartels or even a cartel at the retail level.162 A
horizontal cartel among competing manufacturers or retailers that
reduces output or competition is unlawful under the per se rule;
163 simi-
larly, any vertical RPM agreement that facilitates these same effects
would also be unlawful under a rule of reason analysis.
164
RPM can create equally compelling procompetitive effects.
16 5
153. Id. at 890.
154. Id. at 890-91 (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 172-73 (2d ed. 2001)).
155. Id. at 891 (citing Howard P. Marvel & Stephen McCafferty, Resale Price Maintenance





160. See id. ("[N]ew manufacturers and manufacturers entering new markets can use the
[RPM] restrictions in order to induce competent and aggressive retailers to make the kind of
investment of capital and labor that is often required in the distribution of products unknown to
the consumer." (alteration in original) (quoting Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S.
36, 55 (1977))).
161. Id. at 892.
162. Id. (citing Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 725-26 (1988)).
163. Id. at 893 (citing Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006); Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 58
n.28).
164. Id. ("To the extent a vertical agreement setting minimum resale prices is entered upon to
facilitate either type of cartel, it, too, would need to be held unlawful under the rule of reason.").
165. See Robert L. Steiner, How Manufacturers Deal with the Price-Cutting Retailer: When
Are Vertical Restraints Efficient?, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 407, 446-47 (1996) ("[A]ntitrust law should
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Nonetheless, PSKS argued that "vertical price restraints should be per se
unlawful because of the administrative convenience of per se rules." '66
However, the Leegin Court noted that upholding a per se rule simply out
of concern for administrative costs "misinterprets our antitrust law."1 67
According to the Court, per se rules can diminish consumer welfare by
"prohibiting procompetitive conduct [that] antitrust laws should
encourage." 168 Such rules may also "increase litigation costs by promot-
ing frivolous suits against legitimate practices.' 69 Therefore, "[a]ny
possible reduction in administrative costs [could not] alone justify the
Dr. Miles rule."' 70
The Court also considered the impact of its decision on lower
courts. "As courts gain experience considering the effects of [vertical
prices] restraints by applying the rule of reason over the course of deci-
sions," they can better cope with means "to eliminate anticompetitive
restraints from the market and to provide more guidance to busi-
nesses."'' In fact, the Leegin Court emphasized that courts may "devise
rules over time for offering proof, or even presumptions where justified,
to make the rule of reason a fair and efficient way to prohibit anticompe-
titive restraints and to promote procompetitive" business practices.' 72
The Court next turned to stare decisis.173 The claims made in
Leegin were based on the Sherman Act, which has always been treated
as common law'74 and was intended as a flexible standard that would
change and evolve with "new circumstances and new wisdom."' 75 Dr.
recognize that the consumer interest is often better served by RPM-contrary to its per se
illegality and the rule-of-reason status of vertical nonprice restraints.").
166. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 894 ("[P]er se rules tend to provide guidance to the business
community and to minimize the burdens on litigants and the judicial system." (quoting Sylvania,
433 U.S. at 50 n.16 ) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
167. Id. at 894-95.
168. Id. at 895 (citing Easterbrook, supra note 13, at 158).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 898.
172. Id. at 898-99.
173. See id. at 899.
174. Id. ("From the beginning the Court has treated the Sherman Act as a common-law
statute." (citing Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'I Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978))); Id. ("In
antitrust, the federal courts ... act more as common-law courts than in other areas governed by
federal statute." (alteration in original) (quoting Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union of
Am., AFL-CIO, 451 U.S. 77, 98 n.42 (1981))).
175. Id. at 899-900 ("Just as the common law adapts to modem understanding and greater
experience, so too does the Sherman Act's prohibition on restraint[s] of trade evolve to meet the
dynamics of present economic conditions." (alteration in original)); see also Bus. Elecs. Corp. v.
Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 732 (1988) ("It would make no sense to create out of the single
term 'restraint of trade' a chronologically schizoid statute, in which a 'rule of reason' evolves with
new circumstances and new wisdom, but a line of per se illegality remains forever fixed where it
was.").
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Miles was decided not long after the passage of the Sherman Act when
there was little collective knowledge on the administration of the Act's
then-precedent-setting doctrine.' 76 Subsequent history has eroded the
per se rule. 177 Further, the agencies responsible for enforcing antitrust
laws and studying the long-term impact of RPM have recommended
replacing the per se rule with the rule of reason. 78 In light of this his-
tory, the Court determined that stare decisis did not require "continued
adherence to the per se rule against vertical price restraints."'
179
Finally the Court dismissed PSKS's claim of alleged congressional
support against RPM. PSKS argued that Congress ratified the per se rule
of Dr. Miles with the 1975 congressional repeal' 80 of two prior enact-
ments 81 that provided certain exemptions for vertical price restraints.1
82
The Court found that this repeal did not codify Dr. Miles, but rather
changed the statutory provisions that made certain exceptions per se
legal and provided courts with the power "'to develop governing princi-
ples of law' in the common-law tradition."' 83 Further, the prior enact-
ments were prompted out of a concern to "protect small retail
establishments that Congress thought might otherwise be driven from
the marketplace by large-volume discounters, '"184 not for concerns gov-
erned by the Sherman Act, like fostering competition and protecting
consumer welfare.
185
176. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 900-01.
177. See id. at 901-02 (discussing various cases that broke from the per se doctrine including
United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307-08 (1919) (creating an exception to allow a
manufacturer to refuse to deal with distributors who did not follow suggested resale prices), Cont'l
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57-59 (1977) (replacing the per se rule with a rule
of reason analysis for vertical nonprice restraints), Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465
U.S. 752, 764 (1984) (requiring antitrust plaintiffs to present evidence tending to exclude the
possibility a manufacturer and its distributors acted in an independent manner), and State Oil Co.
v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 22 (1997) (replacing the per se rule with a rule of reason for claims of
vertical maximum price-fixing)).
178. Id. at 900 (citing Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
supra note 152, at 6).
179. Id.
180. See Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801 (1975)
(amending 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970) and 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970)).
181. See Miller-Tydings Act, ch. 690, tit. 8, 50 Stat. 693 (1937), repealed by Consumer Goods
Pricing Act of 1975 § 2; McGuire Act, Pub. L. No. 542-745, §5(a)(2)-(5) 66 Stat. 631, 632
(1952), repealed by Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975 § 3.
182. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 904-05.
183. Id. at 905 (quoting Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 643 (1981)).
184. Id. (quoting Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 102
(1980)) (internal quotations marks omitted).
185. See id. at 906 ("The purpose of the antitrust laws, by contrast, is 'the protection of
competition, not competitors.'" (quoting Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328,
338 (1990))).
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
B. Justice Breyer's Dissent
Writing for the four-member minority,18 6 Justice Breyer opined that
it would be "difficult" to determine whether to apply a rule of reason
analysis or per se rule to RPM in the absence of controlling prece-
dent.'87 However, to the dissenting Justices, the 100-year-old legend of
Dr. Miles made a considerable legal difference. 8 RPM can have seri-
ous anticompetitive consequences, such as diminishing or eliminating
lower prices that many customers prefer, "inhibit[ing] expansion by
more efficient dealers whose lower prices might otherwise attract more
customers," curtailing the development of "more efficient modes of
retailing," and encouraging tacit collusion in concentrated industries.189
In fact, the dissent noted DOJ findings that prior to the 1975 congres-
sional repeal of the Miller-Tydings Act and McGuire Act, states that
permitted minimum RPM experienced price increases between nineteen
and twenty-seven percent.1 90 At the same time, the dissent recognized
that RPM can provide important consumer benefits, such as encouraging
new entry to the market and enticing retailers to provide services, like
advertisements, high-quality displays, and knowledgeable employees. 191
Despite these potential benefits, the dissent argued that while econ-
omists may recommend the adoption of a rule of reason:
[A]ntitrust law cannot, and should not, precisely replicate econo-
mists' (sometimes conflicting) views. That is because law, unlike
economics, is an administrative system the effects of which depend
upon the content of rules and precedents only as they are applied by
judges and juries in courts and by lawyers advising their clients. 
192
After citing several studies finding that RPM may benefit consumer wel-
fare,' 93 the dissent underscored that the studies may, at most, "offer
some mild support for the majority's position. '"'94 However, for the dis-
senters, these studies did not constitute the "major change" required to
"abandon[ ] a well-established antitrust rule."1 95
186. The minority also included Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, and Justice Ginsburg.
187. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 917-18 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
188. See id. at 918.
189. Id. at 910-11.
190. Id. at 912. Many economists have noted that the issue is not whether the nominal price
goes up, because almost everyone expects it to, but rather what the consumer gets in terms of
nonprice competitive services and potential output expansion. To cite price increases is to
misunderstand the whole economic analysis of RPM. That would be similar to arguing that
automobile owners are not better off with safety equipment because it raises the nominal cost of
the vehicle.
191. Id. at 913.
192. Id. at 914-15.
193. Id. at 920 (noting the economic studies described in the amicus and party briefs).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 920, 923.
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The dissent also confronted State Oil Co. v. Khan, decided just ten
years earlier, where the Court overruled an earlier decision'96 holding
maximum resale price agreements to be per se unlawful. Justice Breyer
distinguished the majority's reversal of Dr. Miles from Khan's reversal
of Albrecht v. Herald Co., arguing the latter's overruling of a twenty-
nine-year-old decision was "still a significant period, but nowhere close
to the century Dr. Miles ha[d] stood." '197 The dissent further distin-
guished Khan by contending that Albrecht "had far less support in tradi-
tional antitrust principles than did Dr. Miles."'98 The minority predicted
that the Leegin majority's opinion would likely lead to higher prices for
goods at the retail level and "create considerable legal turbulence as
lower courts seek to develop workable principles."' 99
VI. THE CURRENT STATE OF RESALE PRICE
MAINTENANCE JURISPRUDENCE
Among its many arguments against overturning the per se rule
established in Dr. Miles, PSKS contended that the Court should give
credence to stare decisis.2° Although PSKS did not outright argue that
lower courts are intellectually incapable of applying a rule of reason
analysis, PSKS made the contention in a more passive manner. The
company claimed that Dr. Miles "is clear and easily followed by the
courts," '' effectively suggesting that the lower courts may be unable to
follow a rule of reason analysis but could easily apply a per se rule.
Practitioners have also expressed concern with the current state of
the law.2 ° 2 Some attorneys are so uncertain as to how Leegin will be
interpreted by the lower courts that they have even counseled their cli-
ents against including price restraints from licensing agreements. 3
196. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968), overruled by State Oil v Co. v. Khan, 522
U.S. 18 (1997).
197. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 927 (Breyer. J., dissenting).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 929.
200. Brief of Respondent, supra note 7, at 17.
201. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 124 (1965); Itel
Containers Int'l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 79 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
202. See Mark A. McCarty & Matthew D. Kent, Antitrust Primer: Licensing Intellectual
Property, in 950 PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND
LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES No. 14730, UNDERSTANDING THE INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LICENSE 561, 573 (2008) [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LICENSE] ("Because this decision is relatively new, it is difficult to determine how the lower
courts will interpret the Leegin decisions."); Scott D. Russell, Analytical Framework for Antitrust
Counseling on Intellectual Property Licensing, in UNDERSTANDING THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LICENSE, supra, at 501, 531 ("Lower courts and the antitrust agencies are just beginning to apply
the new Leegin standard, so it's not yet clear what a rule of reason analysis may portend for
antitrust counselors.").
203. See McCarty & Kent, supra note 202, at 573. ('Thus, from an antitrust compliance and
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Even a federal agency has taken a wait-and-see approach, noting that it
intends to monitor the implications of a "seemingly permissible vertical
RPM policy.
' 2°4
In the nearly two years since the Supreme Court first heard Leegin,
numerous alleged violations of the Sherman Act involving vertical price
agreements have traveled through the doors of the courts of appeals and
district courts of the United States. The decisions indicate that Leegin's
holding will be applied case by case based upon the overall circum-
stances, but antitrust plaintiffs alleging vertical price fixing certainly
have a substantial additional burden in establishing a prima facie viola-
tion. Several substantial decisions to date are surveyed below. 0 5
A. Circuit Court Decisions
The Second Circuit explained the rule of reason analysis post-
Leegin in Major League Baseball Properties, Inc. v. Salvino, Inc.2°6 In
Salvino, a marketing corporation appealed the district court's dismissal
of its antitrust claims stemming from Major League Baseball's ("MLB")
exclusive licensing agent's refusal to grant the corporation a license to
sell plush animals embroidered with team logos. 2°7 Citing Leegin, the
Salvino court stated that horizontal price fixing is per se illegal, whereas
the rule of reason applies to vertical price agreements. 20 8 Rule of reason
analysis is appropriate, the court explained, "where the economic and
competitive effects of [a] challenged practice are unclear" and may have
a redeeming virtue.20 9 The court also rejected the application of a "quick
look" rule of reason analysis, essentially reasoning that the defendants'
procompetitive justifications and effects were sufficient to preclude an
abbreviated examination.210
Applying the rule of reason, the Second Circuit affirmed the district
court's finding that no Sherman Act infraction occurred. 211 The court
risk assessment perspective, it is preferable to exclude price restrictions from licensing
agreements.").
204. Russell, supra note 202, at 531 (noting a recent acknowledgment by the Federal Trade
Commission).
205. Several decisions cite Leegin in passing or fail to provide significant analysis. See, e.g.,
Port Dock & Stone Corp. v. Oldcastle Ne., Inc., 507 F.3d 117, 122 n.5 (2d Cir. 2007) (mentioning
Leegin in a footnote but not applying any analysis under the rule of reason). Such decisions have
been omitted.
206. 542 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2008). Former Circuit Judge Sotomayor filed a separate opinion
concurring in the judgment. See id. at 334-41 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
207. Id. at 293-95 (majority opinion).
208. Id. at 315 (citing Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877,
894-95 (2007)).
209. See id. at 316.




found the licensing agent's structure was not an illegal economic cartel
because the licensing agent was a joint venture with procompetitive
effects, such as reduced transaction costs, efficient quality control, and
protection of MLB trademarks.21 2 Furthermore, the agent's blanket
licensing agreement resulted in increased licensees to market MLB
teams and equal profit sharing among the MLB teams, which were not
violations of the Sherman Act under the rule of reason.21 3
The Third Circuit explained its application of the rule of reason
post-Leegin in Toledo Mack Sales & Service, Inc. v. Mack Trucks,
Inc.2" 4 There, a Mack Truck franchisee sued its franchisor for restraining
trade by conspiring to deny sales assistance to franchisees that sold
Mack Trucks outside of their geographically allocated areas of responsi-
bility ("AORs").2 5 Sales assistance heavily affected the overall price at
which the franchisor sold a truck to a franchisee.2" 6 The plaintiff fran-
chisee implemented a low-price sales strategy to compete with other
Mack Truck dealers outside its sales area.21 7 As a result of the fran-
chisee's aggressive sales tactics, the franchisor allegedly "entered into
an agreement with its dealers that it would delay or deny sales assistance
to any dealer who sought to make an out-of-AOR sale."2" 8 The fran-
chisee alleged that this agreement was part of an unlawful conspiracy
between the franchisor and the dealers to sell Mack products at artifi-
cially high prices.219
The franchisee presented evidence demonstrating horizontal agree-
ments that Mack dealers (the franchisees) would not compete against
each other.22 1 "A horizontal cartel among . . . competing retailers that
... reduces competition in order to increase price is, and ought to be, per
se unlawful."2 2 ' In considering the franchisee's evidence, the court con-
cluded that enough evidence existed for a jury to decide whether a per se
unlawful horizontal agreement existed between the franchisees.2 2 2
The franchisee also presented evidence demonstrating an illegal
vertical agreement between the manufacturer and the dealers to illegally
control prices by not providing sales assistance to franchisees that
212. See id. at 327-31.
213. Id. at 319-20.
214. 530 F.3d 204 (3d Cir. 2008).
215. Id. at 210.
216. Id. at 209.
217. Id. at 210.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 220.
221. Id. at 221 (alterations in original) (quoting Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS,
Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 893 (2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
222. Id. at 220-21.
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sought to compete with one another on price. 223 Unlike horizontal price
agreements, which are per se illegal, "the legality of a vertical agree-
ment that imposes a restriction on the dealer's ability to sell the manu-
facturer's product is governed by the rule of reason. ' 224 The court found
that sufficient evidence was presented to show that the purpose of the
vertical agreement between the manufacturer and its franchisees was to
support illegal horizontal agreements among multiple dealers.22 5 Such
vertical agreements that facilitate horizontal cartels, the court explained,
were unlawful under the rule of reason. 226 Ruling that the franchisee
presented enough evidence for the claim to go to a jury, the Third Cir-
cuit vacated the district court's judgment as a matter of law for the
franchisee.227
Just a few months after having its decision in Leegin reversed, the
Fifth Circuit again confronted an issue involving § 1 of the Sherman
Act. In Tunica Web Advertising v. Tunica Casino Operators Ass 'n,22 8
plaintiff Tunica Web Advertising ("TWA"), an internet advertising com-
pany, sued casino operators located in Tunica, Mississippi, alleging that
the casinos refused to deal with the company and that its conduct was a
per se violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 2 29 TWA owned the
domain name "tunica.com" and offered to lease it to Tunica casinos so
that Internet users would be automatically redirected to the Tunica
County Tourism Commission's website, which contained information
about all of the county's casinos. 230 The Tunica Casino Operators Asso-
ciation held a meeting to discuss the matter, and the member casinos
apparently reached an agreement not to use the "tunica.com" domain
name.2 3 ' TWA presented evidence that the Association refused to deal
with TWA in any capacity with the intention that the website would lose
value, allowing the casinos to eventually purchase the name.232 The dis-
trict court granted summary judgment in favor of the casinos, holding
that "the [Association's] alleged conduct could not amount to a per se
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. 2 33
223. Id. at 221-22.
224. Id. at 225 (citing Leegin, 551 U.S. at 907).
225. Id. at 226.
226. See id. (citing Leegin, 551 U.S. at 893). "To the extent a vertical agreement setting
minimum resale prices is entered upon to facilitate either type of cartel, it too, would need to be
held unlawful under the rule of reason." Leegin, 551 U.S. at 893.
227. Toledo Mack Sales, 530 F.3d at 226.
228. 496 F.3d 403, 406 (5th Cir. 2007).
229. Id. at 406.
230. Id. at 407. This proposal would have theoretically been done for the casinos' benefit,
given that the commission's website contained advertising and information about the casinos.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 407-08.
233. ld. at 408. Although not relevant for the purposes of this paper, the district court also
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On appeal, the Fifth Circuit addressed TWA's argument that the
casinos' refusal to do business was a horizontal agreement to boycott,
and therefore a per se violation. 234 The court explained that generally the
rule of reason is used to determine whether a particular agreement is in
fact operating as an unreasonable restraint on competition.235 "Under the
rule of reason, an agreement will be found unlawful only if the plaintiff
shows that it actually had an adverse effect on competition. '"236 How-
ever, the court further explained that certain agreements are inherently
anticompetitive and do not require the plaintiff to show the adverse
effect.237 These agreements are considered per se unlawful. 238 A court's
"decision to apply the per se rule turns on whether the practice facially
appears to be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict
competition and decrease output.
2 39
The court stated that "a necessary precondition for a per se unlaw-
ful group boycott is that it must be [a] 'horizontal"' agreement. 240 Here,
the court found the agreement among the casino operators to indeed be
horizontal because the operators were direct competitors of one
another.241' The district court found that the group boycott could be per
se unlawful only if the agreement was horizontal and at least one of the
conspirators was in direct competition with the victim.2 42 The Fifth Cir-
cuit determined that no such direct competition requirement was
needed.243 According to the court, other factors were more relevant to
the determination of a per se unlawful agreement, including: whether
there were "joint efforts 'to disadvantage competitors"' or control
access by persuading or forcing suppliers to deny relationships with
them; whether the boycotting firms "'possessed a dominant position in
the relevant market' "; and whether the practices could be "'justified by
plausible arguments that they were intended to enhance overall effi-
ciency and make markets more competitive.'
found that the casino association's refusal to deal with TWA was not an unreasonable agreement
in restraint of trade, and that TWA did not show that the casinos' refusal to deal with TWA was
the result of concerted action. Id.
234. Id. at 411-14.
235. Id. at 411-12.




239. Id. (quoting Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S.
284, 289-90 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
240. Id. (citing NYNEX Corp v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 135 (1998)).
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 413-14.
244. Id. (quoting Nw. Wholesale Stationers, 472 U.S. at 294).
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The Fifth Circuit explained that just because an agreement is hori-
zontal in nature does not necessarily mean that it is always per se unlaw-
ful. 24 5 The court interpreted Leegin as follows:
The Supreme Court has reiterated that "[to justify a per se prohibi-
tion a restraint must have manifestly anticompetitive effects and lack
any redeeming virtue." In Leegin, the Supreme Court emphasized its
general reluctance to apply the per se rule unless "the courts can pre-
dict with confidence that it would be invalidated in all or almost all
instances under the rule of reason. 246
Based on these precedents, the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded the
case to the district court to apply the previously discussed principles in
determining whether the per se rule applies.247
The Fifth Circuit again confronted the application of the per se rule
in Golden Bridge Technology, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc.2 48 There, the plain-
tiff Golden Bridge Technology, Inc. ("GBT") owned a patent for certain
wireless technology.249 The defendants and GBT were members of a
nonprofit organization formed to institute uniform technology standards
and equipment for compatibility of cellular devices and systems.250 GBT
claimed that members of the organization conspired not to use its tech-
nology, thereby shutting GBT out of the market.2 1' The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, holding that GBT
had not made the threshold showing that an agreement or conspiracy
existed among the defendants to restrain trade.252
In affirming the district court's holding, the Fifth Circuit discussed
when courts should apply the rule of reason or the per se rule. The court
explained that once a plaintiff has proven a conspiracy, Leegin will
guide courts to determine whether the defendant's conduct "would
always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease out-
put. ' 253 If so, the per se rule is applicable and no further inquiry is
needed by the court 4.2 5  If, on the other hand, the conduct would not
necessarily restrict competition, the rule of reason applies and the plain-
tiff also must prove that the conduct "unreasonably restrains trade in
245. Id. at 414 (citing Nw. Wholesale Stationers, 472 U.S. at 295).
246. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551
U.S. 877, 886 (2007)).
247. Id. at 414-15.
248. 547 F.3d 266 (5th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2055 (2009).
249. Id. at 269.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 270.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 271 (quoting Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886




light of actual market forces. '"255
The Fourth Circuit has also recently addressed the issues raised in
Leegin and appears to be setting some parameters on its holding. First,
in TFWS, Inc. v. Franchot,256 the defendant (the State of Maryland)
2 57
asked the court to revisit its earlier holding that the state's liquor and
wine regulatory scheme was a form of horizontal price fixing and a per
se violation of the Sherman Act." 8 Maryland pointed to the Leegin deci-
sion25 and argued that RPM "is no longer subject to per se analysis
under federal antitrust law, but must instead be judged under [the] rule
of reason. ' 26° The Fourth Circuit rejected Maryland's contention and
explained that Leegin only addressed vertical resale price maintenance,
not horizontal price fixing.26' In fact, the opinion found Leegin to but-
tress the position that horizontal price fixing is per se illegal, quoting
Leegin: "The same legal standard (per se unlawfulness) applies to hori-
zontal market division and horizontal price fixing because both have
similar economic effect.
262
Next, in Valuepest.com of Charlotte, Inc. v. Bayer Corp., the
Fourth Circuit again addressed the Leegin holding and its effect.2 63
Valuepest, pest control service providers, filed a class-action lawsuit
against defendants, manufacturers of pesticides.26 Valuepest alleged
that the defendants "illegally conspired with their distributors to set min-
imum resale prices of certain [pest]icide products. ' 26' The defendants
(collectively referred to as Bayer) countered that Supreme Court prece-
dent-United States v. General Electric Co.266-held that a manufac-
turer could set minimum prices for its products where there is "a genuine
principal-agent relationship between the manufacturer and its distribu-
tors. 2 67 Valuepest countered that Leegin implicitly overruled this
precedent.268
255. Id. (citing Leegin, 551 U.S. at 886).
256. 572 F.3d 186 (4th Cir. 2009).
257. Defendant Franchot is the Comptroller of the State of Maryland and was named along
with other various Maryland officials in the suit.
258. TFWS, 572 F.3d at 188.
259. Leegin was decided during the course of the numerous trial procedures involved in this
case.
260. TFWS, at 191.
261. Id. at 188, 192.
262. Id. (quoting Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 904 (2007))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
263. 561 F.3d 282 (4th Cir. 2009).
264. Id. at 284.
265. Id.
266. 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
267. Valupest.com, 561 F.3d at 284 (citing General Electric, 272 U.S. 476).
268. Id.
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Bayer sold its termite pesticide through a series of distributors and
used distribution arrangements whereby the distributors purchased the
pesticide from Bayer and then resold it to pest control services such as
Valuepest.269 In 2001, Bayer began selling its pesticide through an
agency relationship arrangement.27 ° Under these agreements, Bayer was
the seller of the product, and the agent/distributor merely facilitated the
sale. 7 1 The agreements specified that Bayer retained title to the product
and set the retail prices, and the distributors received a fixed commission
for each sale. 72 In 2005, Valuepest filed suit in the Western District of
North Carolina, alleging vertical price fixing by Bayer pursuant to its
arrangement with the distributors.2 3 Both sides filed motions for sum-
mary judgment.274 While the district court was considering the motions,
the Supreme Court heard arguments in the Leegin case.275 The district
court issued an order stating it would wait to rule on Valupest's sum-
mary judgment motion until after Leegin was decided but would con-
tinue considering Bayer's motion. 76 After the Supreme Court decided
Leegin, the district court granted summary judgment for Bayer on the
grounds that there was a genuine agency relationship and therefore no
liability under § 1 of the Sherman Act.27 7
The agency defense is premised on the reasoning that a manufac-
turer has the right to sell its products on the terms of its choosing.278
When it uses bona fide agents, the manufacturer is essentially selling its
products directly to consumers and there is no conspiracy involved. 9
However, on appeal Valuepest claimed that the General Electric agency
defense was no longer viable after Leegin.28° The Fourth Circuit rejected
Valuepest's argument, stating that the two cases dealt with two separate
elements of a § 1 violation.281 In the Fourth Circuit's view, General
Electric dealt with the first element of § 1, namely whether there was a
contract, combination, or conspiracy.282 Leegin, on the other hand,
addressed the second element, whether the contract, combination, or
269. Id






276. Id. at 286.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 287 (citing United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 485 (1926)).
279. See id. (explaining the holding in General Electric).





conspiracy imposed an unreasonable restraint of trade.283 The court
stated that "only alleged [RPM] that actually involves an agreement
between two parties [falls] within the scope of § 1."2 Here, because the
court found that a genuine principal-agency relationship precluded the
existence of an agreement, 285 it was not necessary to look to the second
element and Leegin.286 According to the court, Valuepest blurred the
distinction between the two elements of liability under § 1 by arguing
that Leegin overruled General Electric even if a genuine agency rela-
tionship existed.287 Leegin addressed an entirely different issue than
General Electric, namely whether a proven agreement should be consid-
ered per se unlawful or analyzed under the rule of reason.288
The Fourth Circuit explained that Leegin abolished the per se rule
for vertical price restraints and transitioned to the rule of reason.289
"Under the rule of reason, a factfinder examines all of the circumstances
to determine whether a practice unreasonably restrains competition,
' 290
looking at factors such as "the restraint's history, nature, and effect, as
well as [w]hether the businesses involved have market power."'291 The
court stated that Leegin would only have relevance to the case "if plain-
tiffs [could] prove the agency relationships ... were a sham" and, there-
fore, an agreement for antitrust purposes existed.292 However, the court
reiterated that the Leegin and General Electric holdings are independent
of one another: "Quite simply, Leegin has no bearing on the continued
vitality of General Electric."'2 93
B. District Court Decisions
Although circuit courts have provided the most in-depth analysis of
the rule of reason, district courts have also applied the Leegin rule in
several contexts, indicating its practical impact. For example, in Spahr v.
Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc., the Eastern District of Tennes-
see dismissed the proposed purchaser's class-action claims because the
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. See id. at 294.
286. See id. at 288.
287. Id. at 287-88.
288. Id. at 288.
289. Id. at 287.
290. Id. (citing Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885 (2007)).
291. Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Leegin, 551 U.S. at 885-86; State
Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
292. Id. at 288.
293. Id.
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complaint failed to allege the appropriate relevant market.294 In a deci-
sion following the Supreme Court's mandate in Leegin, the district court
copied much of the Leegin opinion in finding that Leegin's refusal to
sell to retailers who discounted Brighton brand products below Leegin's
suggest price was a vertical restraint, governed by the rule of reason.295
"The threshold question in any rule of reason antitrust case is definition
of the relevant market. '296 The court refused to accept the plaintiffs'
proposed relevant product market as the "market for the manufacture,
distribution and/or sale of Brighton brand products" because the product
line of women's accessories made by other manufacturers are reasona-
bly interchangeable. 97
In Babyage.com, Inc. v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., smaller retailers sued a
larger retailer after the manufacturers of baby goods required the retail-
ers to sell the baby goods at or above a certain price. 298 The smaller
retailers alleged that the dominant retailer conspired with the manufac-
turers to set the prices of baby goods.2 99 The large retailer moved for an
interlocutory appeal after the court denied its motion to dismiss. 3" The
motion for an interlocutory appeal was denied because in the nonfinal
order denying the motion, the plaintiffs set forth the relevant legal mar-
ket and harm to competition.3"' In explaining the "harm to competition"
legal standard, the district court stated that "harm to intrabrand competi-
tion is cognizable when brought about by the demands of a 'dominant'
retailer, one that has market power in the retail sales market and one
upon whom each manufacturer depends for a large portion of its
sales. 30 2 The court explained that Leegin signified that abuse of mini-
mum resale prices set by dominant retailers is the type of conduct the
Sherman Act was designed to prohibit.303
In Flying J, Inc. v. Van Hollen, a gasoline retailer sued the Wiscon-
sin Attorney General to prevent the State from enforcing its statute
requiring a minimum markup on gasoline prices. 3° The court found that
294. Spahr v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., No. 2:07-CV-187, 2008 WL 3914461, at
* 11 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 20, 2008).
295. See id. at *3-7.
296. Id. at *8.
297. Id. at *8-9.
298. Babyage.com, Inc. v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., Nos. 05-6792, 06-242, 2008 WL 2746302, at *1
(E.D. Pa. July 15, 2008).
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. See id. at *3-4.
302. Id. at *3 (quoting Babyage.com, Inc. v. Toys "R" Us, Inc.. 558 F.Supp.2d 575, 583 (E.D.
Pa 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) and citing Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v.
PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 893-94, 897-98 (2007)).
303. Id. at *4 (citing Leegin, 551 U.S. at 893-94).
304. 597 F. Supp. 2d 848, 851 (E.D. Wis. 2009). The Eastern District of Wisconsin had ruled
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the statute, which forbade gasoline retailers from selling their fuel below
a 9.18% markup of the average posted terminal price,3°5 was a per se
restraint because it authorized and enforced a horizontal pricing pol-
icy.306 The court cited Leegin because the State argued that the statute
should be analyzed under the rule of reason, presumably because it
believed the statute was a vertical restraint.30 7 The court disagreed with
the State's classification, finding that the statute was also horizontal
because it affected competing gasoline retailers in Wisconsin. 3° 8 "Leegin
reaffirmed that a 'horizontal cartel among competing manufacturers or
competing retailers that decreases output or reduces competition in order
to increase price is, and ought to be, per se unlawful.'
The precursor to Flying J, Inc. v. Van Hollen was Lotus Business
Group LLC v. Flying J Inc., in which a gasoline retailer alleged that
another gasoline retailer had violated the same Wisconsin statute at issue
in Flying J, Inc. v. Van Hollen.3" ° The Lotus court found that the statute
was inconsistent with and preempted by § 1 of the Sherman Act because
it fixed resale prices industrywide.31 ' The Supreme Court issued the
Leegin decision shortly after the Lotus court's initial decision finding the
statute unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause. The plaintiff
accordingly requested a rehearing, arguing that the rule of reason was
the standard to judge the alleged vertical restraint.312 The court
explained that the rule of reason requires "the factfinder [to weigh] all of
the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice
should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competi-
tion. ' 313 In analyzing a case under the rule of reason, courts consider
"specific information about the relevant business and the restraint's his-
tory, nature, and effect. 31 4 The court concluded that the statute was
inconsistent with the Sherman Act as a per se violation that involved
horizontal pricing because the statute fixed prices industrywide and was
the statute unconstitutional in a previous proceeding. Id. at 853 (citing Lotus Bus. Group LLC v.
Flying J Inc., 532 F. Supp. 2d 1011 (E.D. Wis. 2007)). Despite this ruling, the State continued its
attempt to enforce the statute against the plaintiff gas station. Id.
305. Id. at 851.
306. Id. at 856.
307. Id. at 857 (citing Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877
(2007)).
308. Id. (citing Lotus, 532 F. Supp. 2d at 1028).
309. Id. (quoting Leegin, 551 U.S. at 893).
310. See Lotus, 532 F. Supp. 2d at 1012.
311. Id. at 1028.
312. Id. at 1026.
313. Id. at 1026 (quoting Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885
(2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
314. Id. (quoting Leegin, 551 U.S. 877, 885) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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"virtually certain to reduce interbrand competition." '315
District courts frequently apply the rule of reason in class actions
alleging Sherman Act violations. For example, in Stand Energy Corp. v.
Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., the court denied the proposed class
of plaintiffs' motion for class certification in a suit alleging an "illegal
scheme involving the transportation and storage of natural gas." '3 16 The
court relied upon Leegin to deny class certification. 17 Per se unlawful
horizontal agreements exist, the court reasoned, when competitors agree
"to fix prices or to divide markets." '318 However, "where the economic
impact of certain practices is not immediately obvious," courts are
"reluctant to adopt per se rules."'3 19 According to the court, the rule of
reason is applied to vertical price restraints because they may benefit
competition in some ways.320 Under the rule of reason, fact finders
"weigh[ ] all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a
restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable
restraint on competition.
321
The court denied class certification because the plaintiffs asserted
that each individual defendant entered into a separate contract with the
gas shipper, which in the court's view was not a single conspiracy.322
Applying the rule of reason test, the court looked to each agreement
individually and not as a whole to determine whether an unlawful verti-
cal price restraint existed.323
In another class-action case, the District Court for the District of
Columbia partially denied summary judgment for the defendant manu-
facturer in Meijer, Inc. v. Barr Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 324 There, the class
of direct purchasers of brand-name oral contraceptives brought an anti-
trust suit alleging that the manufacturer of a generic oral contraceptive
entered into an illegal agreement with the brand manufacturer to delay
the introduction of the generic brand.325 The court analyzed the agree-
ment between the manufacturers under the rule of reason. 26 Reasona-
bleness depends on "a broad range of considerations, including specific
315. Id. at 1028.
316. Stand Energy Corp. v. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., No. 2:04-0867, 2008 WL
3891219, at *1 (S.D.W. Va. Aug. 19, 2008).
317. See id. at *14.
318. Id. (quoting Leegin, 551 U.S. at 886) (internal quotation marks omitted).
319. Id. (quoting Leegin, 551 U.S. at 887) (internal quotation marks omitted).
320. Id. (citing Chuck's Feed & Seed Co. v. Ralston Purina Co., 810 F.2d 1289, 1294 (4th Cir.
1987)).
321. Id. (quoting Leegin, 551 U.S. at 885) (internal quotation marks omitted).
322. Id. at *15.
323. Id. at *16-17.
324. 572 F. Supp. 2d 38, 65 (D.D.C. 2008).
325. Id. at 44.
326. See id. at 52.
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information about the relevant product market, the history, nature, and
effect of the particular restraint, and whether the companies involved
have market or monopoly power. 3 27 The court focused on the market
realities of the entire agreement in ultimately refusing to apply the per se
rule.3 28 Departures from the rule of reason "must be based upon demon-
strable economic effect rather than . . . upon formalistic line draw-
ing. 329 In analyzing the economic effects on the relevant market, the
court found that the anticompetitive effects of the agreement were
unclear because they arose in the context of an exclusive supply
relationship.33 °
In Champagne Metals v. Ken-Mac Metals, Inc., the court reaf-
firmed that Leegin applies to the second element of § 1 Sherman Act
violations. 3 1 The court considered a motion for summary judgment by
the defendants, who claimed that an agreement did not exist.332 The
plaintiff aluminum distributor sued other distributors, claiming that the
defendants acted in concert to pressure the mills against supplying the
plaintiff with aluminum.333
The court found sufficient evidence of an agreement for summary
judgment purposes, and then moved to the second element of whether
the alleged restraint of trade was unreasonable. 334 The court explained
that "[t]wo main analytical approaches are used to determine whether a
defendant's conduct unreasonably restrains trade-the per se rule and
the rule of reason. ' 335 The per se rule "treats certain categories of
restraints as necessarily illegal. '336 By contrast, the rule of reason
requires the fact finder to "weigh[ ] all of the circumstances of a case in
deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing
an unreasonable restraint on competition. '337 The court found that the
agreement was subject to per se review.338 An important factor in the
court's decision, specifically supported by Leegin, was the fact there was
327. Id. at 47 (citing Leegin Creative Leather Prods. Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885-86
(2007)).
328. Id. at 49-50.
329. Id. at 49 (alteration in original) (quoting Leegin, 551 U.S. at 887) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
330. Id. at 51.
331. See Champagne Metals v. Ken-Mac Metals, Inc., No. CIV-02-0528-HE, 2007 WL
4115994, at *2 (W.D. Okla. July 27, 2007).
332. Id. at *1.
333. Id. at *1 & n.4.
334. Id. at *2.
335. Id. (citing FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 457-58 (1986)).
336. Id.
337. Id. (quoting Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885 (2007))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
338. Id. at *4.
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a horizontal agreement among the defendant distributors.3 39 However,
the existence of the horizontal agreement was not, in and of itself,
enough. 340 The court also found that the defendant's market power,
"combined with the lack of a plausible argument justifying the alleged
boycott," contributed to the need for per se review.341
In New England Carpenters Health Benefits Fund v. McKesson
Corp., the district court addressed a motion to dismiss a class-action
lawsuit brought on behalf of third-party payors and consumers who
alleged that a drug wholesaler engaged in illegal price-fixing by entering
into an agreement with a drug-pricing publisher to inflate the average
wholesale price of certain pharmaceuticals.342 The defendant's motion to
dismiss was premised on the grounds that the plaintiffs "fail[ed] to
allege any anticompetitive effects from the conspiracy to increase
prices.
The district court used Leegin to guide its analysis in determining
whether to apply the per se rule or the rule of reason. The plaintiffs
contended the alleged conspiracy qualified as per se unreasonable.3 4
The district court explained that application of this standard is "only
appropriate where 'courts have had considerable experience with the
type of restraint at issue, and only if courts can predict with confidence
that it would be invalidated in all or almost all instances under the rule
of reason.' ,,34' The court agreed with the plaintiffs' concession that the
alleged conspiracy was a "unique case," that rested on a "novel theory
that ha[d] not yet been brought before the courts. '3 46 Therefore, the per
se rule would be inappropriate.347
After quickly dismissing the plaintiffs' alternative request to apply
the "quick-look" analysis, the court turned to the rule of reason.3 48 The
district court noted that the rule of reason requires "an onerous multi-
part showing: (1) that the alleged agreement involved the exercise of
power in a relevant economic market; (2) that this exercise had anti-
competitive consequences; (3) and that those detriments outweighed
339. Id. at *2 (explaining that "horizontal agreements among competitors to fix prices or to
divide markets" are per se unlawful (citing Leegin, 551 U.S. at 886)).
340. See id. at *3 (noting that not all horizontal restraints of trade are per se illegal).
341. Id. at *4.
342. New England Carpenters Health Benefits Fund v. McKesson Corp., 573 F. Supp. 2d 431,
432-33 (D. Mass. 2008).
343. Id. at 433.
344. Id. at 434.
345. Id. (quoting Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886-87
(2007)).
346. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
347. Id.
348. Id. at 435-36.
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efficiencies or other economic benefits."34 9 Additionally, quoting
Leegin, the district court explained that the rule of reason "distinguishes
between restraints with anticompetitive effect.., and restraints stimulat-
ing competition .... -350 The court found that the plaintiffs were making
blanket assertions of higher prices but failed to show any anticompeti-
tive conduct."' Thus, the court granted the defendant's motion to
dismiss.
3 5 2
In Leegin, the Supreme Court warned of anticompetitive effects
that may arise from vertical resale price maintenance. 3  One specific
example the Supreme Court counseled lower courts to watch for was a
dominant retailer in the market that abuses its power and requests RPM
"to forestall innovation in distribution that decreases costs." 354 A manu-
facturer could find that it had "little choice but to accommodate the
[dominant] retailer's demands . . . if the manufacturer believe[d] it
need[ed] access to the retailer's distribution network" to sell its
product.355
In McDonough v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., the district court confronted
just such a situation.356 The court was deciding whether to certify a class
in a suit against a dominant retailer in the market.357 The case involved
the rise of Babies "R" Us ("BRU") in the baby-product retail market.
Small specialty stores dominated the market during the early 1990s; but
by the end of the decade, BRU had come to dominate the market, and
the number of specialty stores had dwindled greatly. 8 In the late 1990s
and into the early 2000s, however, BRU began to face stiff competition
from internet providers of baby products that could offer price discounts
due to their low overhead. 9
The plaintiffs,3 6° seeking class-action certification, offered evi-
dence that BRU responded to this competition by "coerc[ing] manufac-
349. Id. at 435 (quoting Stop & Shop Supermarket Co. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 373 F.3d
57, 61 (1st Cir. 2004)).
350. Id. (quoting Leegin, 551 U.S. at 886) (internal quotation marks omitted).
351. Id. at 435-36.
352. Id. at 436.
353. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 892-93.
354. Id. at 893.
355. Id. at 893-94.
356. See McDonough v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., No. 06-0242, 2009 WL 2055168, at *1 (E.D. Pa.
July 15, 2009) (noting that a dominant retailer "allegedly coerced manufacturers into adopting
vertical price restraints").
357. Id.
358. Id. at *2.
359. Id.
360. Plaintiffs were actual customers of Babies "R" Us who alleged that they paid higher
prices for the products they bought due to the defendants' conduct in imposing price restraints. Id.
at *1.
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turers of baby products into preventing internet retailers from offering
discounts. 361 Specifically, they claimed that BRU would threaten not to
carry the manufacturers' products unless they agreed to prevent the
online retailers from discounting the products.362 In turn, the manufac-
turers used various methods to prevent discounting, including the use of
resale price maintenance (vertical price restraints). 363 In negotiations
with various manufacturers of baby products, BRU would provide the
manufacturers with distribution agreements to use for the online retail-
ers, which included vertical price restraints. 364 Plaintiffs offered evi-
dence that one manufacturer told an online retailer that if the decision
was between doing what BRU asks or supporting the online retailer's
right to discount, "[t]he very important customer wins every time. '365
In deciding whether to certify the class, the court examined the
antitrust claim of unreasonable restraint, guided especially by the Leegin
opinion.366 The court began by noting that in the wake of Leegin, "verti-
cal price restraints should be analyzed under the rule of reason" rather
than the per se rule.367 It also pointed out the factors to consider under
the rule of reason, including "[w]hether the businesses involved have
market power. '368 The court examined the three situations noted in
Leegin where vertical price restraints may benefit interbrand
competition:
369
First, a manufacturer might use resale price maintenance to eliminate
intrabrand price competition .... Second, vertical price restraints
may promote interbrand competition by facilitating market entry for
new brands. . . .[Finally], [the] restraints may promote interbrand
competition by helping manufacturers induce retailers to perform ser-
vices [that may have been absent before].37°
The court took seriously the Supreme Court's instruction to "be
diligent in eliminating [vertical price restraints'] anticompetitive uses
361. Id. at *2.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Id. at *3-6.
365. Id. at *4.
366. See id. at *14-17.
367. Id. at *15 (citing Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 907
(2007)).
368. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Leegin, 551 U.S. at 885-86 (2007)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
369. Id. McDonough deals with interbrand competition, where "manufacturers [are] competing
to sell different brands of the same type of product." Id. (citing Leegin, 551 U.S. at 890).
Intrabrand competition "refers to retailers competing to sell the same brand." Id. "[A]ntitrust law
gives priority to interbrand competition." Id. (citing Leegin, 551 U.S. at 890).
370. Id. (citing Leegin, 551 U.S. at 891-92).
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from the market."37' It noted the anticompetitive effects that were
pointed out in Leegin, including where a dominant retailer requests price
maintenance not to stimulate services or to promote the manufacturer's
brand, but rather to "give [the] inefficient retailer[ ] higher profits" and
prevent the more efficient retailers from charging lower prices.37 2 It then
noted other factors discussed in Leegin, specifically pointing out the lan-
guage related to where the source of the restraint originated and noting
that "[i]f there is evidence [that] retailers were the impetus for [the] ver-
tical price restraint," the likelihood is greater that the restraint "supports
a dominant, inefficient retailer." '373
The district court employed a burden-shifting analysis under the
rule of reason, where the plaintiff bears an initial burden to show that the
agreement "produced adverse, anti-competitive effects within the rele-
vant product and geographic markets." '37 4 If the plaintiff meets this bur-
den, the burden is shifted to the defendant "to show that the challenged
conduct promotes a sufficiently pro-competitive objective. 375 The dis-
trict court concluded by finding that "the § 1 elements of concerted
action and unreasonable restraint [were] both 'capable of proof at trial'"
and that the predominance element of class-action certification had been
satisfied.376
As these cases reveal, although the courts have begun to apply the
rule of reason in the wake of Leegin, it is still too soon to draw any hard-
and-fast rules about the impact of the Supreme Court's decision. Cer-
tainly, with the end of per se violations based on vertical price mainte-
nance, plaintiffs' cases in that context are more problematic, and
defendants are concurrently less likely to suffer liability. As cases like
Toledo Mack Sales & Service, Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc. 37 7 show, the rule
of reason analysis itself is sufficiently broad to allow a plaintiff with
sufficient documentation and expert analysis to survive to trial. The con-
tours of the analysis, however, will take years of precedent to emerge.
VII. CONCLUSION
The waves created by the majority opinion in Leegin are certain to
wash ashore and slowly erode the sand castles erected by corporate anti-
371. Id. at *15 (quoting Leegin, 551 U.S. at 897) (internal quotation marks omitted).
372. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Leegin, 551 U.S. at 893) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
373. Id. (quoting Leegin, 551 U.S. at 897-98) (internal quotation marks omitted).
374. Id. at *16 (quoting United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668-69 (3d Cir. 1993))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
375. Id. (quoting Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 669) (internal quotation marks omitted).
376. Id. at *17.
377. 530 F.3d 204 (3d Cir. 2008).
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trust counsel over the past century. The tales of Dr. Miles and the per se
rule against vertical price restraints have been forever banished to the
fiction novels, as Leegin ushers in an emerging new day in antitrust
jurisprudence. The Court grounded its opinion in a wealth of economic
literature that radiates the potential procompetitive effects of vertical
price agreements and validates reliance upon the rule of reason. Leegin
invites manufacturers to rethink minimum price restraints to advance
procompetitive purposes.
Over the subtle suggestion by PSKS that lower federal courts may
find it difficult to apply the rule of reason, circuit and district judges
across the nation have applied Leegin in a seemingly effortless manner.
The cases in the two years following Leegin have revealed that as courts
gain more experience with reasonable business customs, jurists are will-
ing to consider a broad range of evidence to ensure that U.S. antitrust
laws safeguard consumer welfare and promote competition. As the dust
continues to settle, corporate executives and counsel alike will consider
the opportunities that the rule of reason provides to innovate marketing
and resale practices beyond rivalry on mere price points.
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